The Use and Threat of Injunctions in the Rand Context

The Use and Threat of Injunctions in the Rand Context
复制标题

兰德背景下禁令的使用和威胁

DOI:
10.1093/joclec/nhs038
复制
发表时间:
2013
影响因子:
1.5
通讯作者:
D. Rubinfeld
D. Rubinfeld
中科院分区:
经济学4区
文献类型:
--
作者:
James D. Ratliff;D. Rubinfeld

文献摘要

被引文献

相似文献

我们模拟了标准必要专利的所有者和标准的实施者之间的纠纷,专利权人的许可提供是合理的和非歧视性的(兰德)。不排除发出禁令的可能性,但这种威胁不会导致拖延。一个关键因素是,实现者总是有能力接受由法院认证为兰德或专利权人和实现者共同同意的许可条款,作为最后的手段。
We model a dispute between the owner of a standard-essential patent and implementer of the standard over which the patentee's license offer is reasonable and nondiscriminatory (RAND). An injunction is not rule out, yet that threat does not lead to holdup. A key element is that the implementer always has as a last-resortthe ability to accept license terms that are either certified by a court as RAND or mutually agreed upon by the patentee and implementer.