Replicator dynamics in public goods games with reward funds
Replicator dynamics in public goods games with reward funds
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.07.026
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发表时间：
2011-10-21
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Unemi, Tatsuo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Sasaki, Tatsuya;Unemi, Tatsuo
哪种惩罚或奖励最能有效地维持公共产品互动中的合作，并阻止那些愿意从他人的贡献中获益的叛逃者？制裁制度本身是一种公益，可能造成有问题的“二阶搭便车者”，他们对制裁的规定没有贡献，因此可能破坏制裁所支持的合作。最近的研究表明，如果参与游戏是可选的，那么带有惩罚的公共产品游戏可能会导致一个基于欺诈的政权。在这里，我们揭示了即使强制参与，奖励也可以在无限大的人口中维持合作。我们考虑了标准公共产品博弈中参与者的三种策略：在标准公共产品博弈中成为合作者或背叛者，或者成为为公共产品做出贡献的奖励者，并成为奖励在博弈中做出贡献的参与者的基金。合作者不向奖励基金捐款，因此被归类为二等搭便车者。这三种策略的复制者动态呈现出一个石头剪刀布的循环，尽管预期收益是非线性的，但仍然可以进行充分的分析。该模型不需要重复的交互、空间结构、群体选择或声誉。我们还讨论了一种简单的二阶制裁方法，它可以导致一个全球稳定的状态，100%的人口都是奖励者。(C)2011爱思唯尔有限公司保留所有权利。
Which punishment or rewards are most effective at maintaining cooperation in public goods interactions and deterring defectors who are willing to freeload on others' contribution? The sanction system is itself a public good and can cause problematic "second-order free riders" who do not contribute to the provisions of the sanctions and thus may subvert the cooperation supported by sanctioning. Recent studies have shown that public goods games with punishment can lead to a coercion-based regime if participation in the game is optional. Here, we reveal that even with compulsory participation, rewards can maintain cooperation within an infinitely large population. We consider three strategies for players in a standard public goods game: to be a cooperator or a defector in a standard public goods game, or to be a rewarder who contributes to the public good and to a fund that rewards players who contribute during the game. Cooperators do not contribute to the reward fund and are therefore classified as second-order free riders. The replicator dynamics for the three strategies exhibit a rock-scissors-paper cycle, and can be analyzed fully, despite the fact that the expected payoffs are nonlinear. The model does not require repeated interaction, spatial structure, group selection, or reputation. We also discuss a simple method for second-order sanctions, which can lead to a globally stable state where 100% of the population are rewarders. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.