Inefficient arbitrage in inter-regional electricity transmission
Inefficient arbitrage in inter-regional electricity transmission
复制标题
跨区域输电套利效率低下
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
G. Zachmann
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Bunn;G. Zachmann
本文分析了一个明确的事前拍卖网络接入，以促进两个独立的，但联系，电力批发市场之间的交易的效率。人们普遍认为，更大的区域互联将减轻行使当地市场势力的主导发电机，但我们分析表明，当一个占主导地位的球员有机会进入一个更具竞争力的邻近市场，也是成本最低的生产者，市场势力的行使变得有吸引力，可以有负面的消费者福利的影响。为了进行实证分析，我们使用了英法互联网（IFA）上每日公司级流量提名的独特数据集。这提供了一个明确的案例研究，“无环路流动”（IFA是英国和法国之间的唯一联系）。我们能够识别市场行为中明显的低效率，对此有几种解释，包括市场力量，可能有所贡献。
This paper analyzes the efficiency of an explicit ex ante auction for network access to facilitating trade between two separate, but linked, electricity wholesale markets. It is generally assumed that greater regional interconnection will mitigate the exercise of local market power by dominant generators, but we show analytically that when a dominant player has access to a more competitive neighboring market, and is also the lowest cost producer, the exercise of market power becomes attractive and can have negative consumer welfare implications. For an empirical analysis, we use a unique data set of daily company-level flow nominations on the Anglo-French Interconnector (IFA). This provides a clear case study, “free of loop flows” (with the IFA being the only link between the UK and France). We are able to identify evident inefficiencies in the market behavior, for which several explanations, including market power, may contribute.