Exploring negative territory Carbon dioxide removal and climate policy initiatives
Exploring negative territory Carbon dioxide removal and climate policy initiatives
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探索负面领域二氧化碳清除和气候政策举措
作者：
J. Meadowcroft
CDR的流程。因此，管理研究与发展活动的政策和管理框架必须针对每一种特定的办法进行调整。此外，政策差异不仅仅是选择首选技术，最重要的是确保部署的技术得到适当实施。例如，一些研究表明，执行不力的BEECS战略实际上可能会通过间接的土地利用变化(例如，能源作物取代粮食生产和鼓励更多的森林砍伐)来增加温室气体排放(Creutzig等人)。2012年)。人们可以想象，政府直接资助减少二氧化碳排放的活动是一种公共产品，但到目前为止，气候政策的主旨一直是让排放实体对减排负责，并争取价格机制(通过碳税或总量管制和交易体系)，以鼓励整个经济的适应。在这种模式下，CDR活动将产生二氧化碳减排信用额度。无论哪种CDR方法受到青睐，将其纳入缓解框架都需要建立以下机制：a)确定大气中的排放实际上是在预期的水平上进行的；b)确保被封存碳的长期安全；以及c)将附带损害降至最低。对于国家温室气体清单和遵守国际协议，需要对二氧化碳流量进行定量核查；但这对企业也至关重要。虽然可以从化石燃料消耗的数据中对排放和减排做出相当准确的估计，但清除的情况要复杂得多。以森林为例：实际的二氧化碳吸收会因森林类型、树种组合、成熟度和气候条件而异。碳吸收将持续数十年，有关森林生长的历史数据可能会被证明具有误导性，特别是在气候变化的情况下。虽然量化来自BECCS或空气捕获的用于地质储存的二氧化碳可能相当简单，但对于生物炭、强化风化或海洋肥力来说，情况远非如此。这意味着CDR项目运作的严格协议，以及适当的衡量和核查制度。要使CDR有效，自动减支必须是长期的。如果新种植的森林受到农业、定居点、火灾或虫害的侵蚀，如果用于空气捕获或BECCS的地质存储被证明不安全，或者欺诈夸大了长期封存数字，会发生什么？在许多情况下，测量和监测将不得不长期持续下去。它还意味着制定适当的补救和赔偿计划(如果储存发生故障)和相关的责任制度。关于附带损害，标准的假设是，将寻求CDR，因为与减排选择相比，它可以以有利的成本获得担保。但这只有在CDR途径的全部社会成本(相对于实现一个项目的特定行为者的成本)较低的情况下才有利于社会的整体利益。这意味着，CDR项目还必须考虑其他“外部性”因素。归根结底，解决这些问题的唯一方法是由公共当局对授权的技术/方法进行监管：一方面，通过与每个CRD类别有关的国际规则(遵守项目是国际承认碳排放信用的先决条件)；另一方面，通过与土地使用规划、环境和安全问题等有关的国家和地方规则。但是，政策系统在管理如此复杂、具有多种交叉联系和不确定性的问题时所面临的困难怎么强调都不为过(Meadowcroft 2007)。政治学文献中反复出现的一个主题是现代民主国家政策制定的渐进性、偶然性和支离破碎的特征；以及寻求“理性-综合”方法解决问题的难度(Lindblom 1979；Kingdon 1984)。我们不可能事先预料到假想的CDR项目的所有后果。只有随着时间的推移，人们才会意识到一些影响，才会充分了解每个CDR选项的好处和成本。因此，适当的政策框架必须144气候变化(2013)118：137-149
process of CDR. Thus the policy and regulatory frameworks governing CRD activities must be tailored to each particular approach. Moreover, policy differentiation is not just about selecting preferred techniques, but above all about ensuring that techniques that are deployed are implemented appropriately. For example, some studies suggest that poorly implemented BEECS strategies could actually increase GHG emissions through indirect land use changes (for example, energy crops displacing food production and encouraging additional forest clearances) (Creutzig et al. 2012). One could imagine governments directly financing activities to draw down CO2 as a public good, but the thrust of climate policy to this point has been to make emitting entities responsible for abatement, and to enlist the price mechanism (through a carbon tax or cap and trade system) to encourage adaptation across the economy. On this model, CDR activities would result in carbon dioxide reduction credits. Whichever CDR approaches are favored, their integration into mitigation frameworks requires mechanisms to: a) establish atmospheric withdrawals are actually taking place at the intended levels, b) ensure the long term security of the sequestered carbon, and c) minimize collateral damage. Quantitative verification of CO2 flows is required for national greenhouse gas inventories and compliance with international accords; but it is also critical for businesses. While reasonably accurate estimates of emissions and emissions reductions can be made from data on fossil fuel consumption, things are more complex with removals. Consider forests: actual CO2 uptake varies according to forest types, species mix, maturity, and climactic conditions. Carbon uptake will be spread over decades and historic data on forest growth may prove misleading, especially as the climate changes. While quantifying CO2 sent for geological storage from BECCS or air capture may be reasonably straightforward, the same is far from true for biochar, enhanced weathering or ocean fertilization. This implies strict protocols for the operation of CDR projects, and appropriate measurement and verification regimes. For CDR to be effective, sequestration must be for the long term. What happens if a newly planted forest is eroded by agriculture, settlement, fire, or insect attack; if geologic storage for air capture or BECCS proves insecure; or fraud exaggerates long term sequestration figures? In many cases measurement and monitoring will have to continue for the long term. It also implies the preparation of appropriate remediation and compensation plans (if storage breaks down) and associated liability regimes. With respect to collateral damage, the standard assumption is that CDR would be pursued because it could be secured at favorable cost as compared to emissions abatement options. But this is only to the overall benefit of society if the full social cost (as opposed to the cost for the specific actors realizing a project) is lower for the CDR pathway. This means other ‘externalities’ accompanying CDR projects must be taken into consideration. Ultimately, the only way to deal with these is by the regulation of authorized technologies/approaches by public authorities: on the one hand, through international rules relating to each CRD class (with project compliance a pre-condition for international recognition of carbon removal credits); and on the other, through national and local rules relating to land use planning, environmental and safety issues, and so on. But the difficulty which policy systems have in managing issues of such complexity, with multiple cross-cutting interconnections and uncertainties, cannot be overstated (Meadowcroft 2007). A recurrent theme in the political science literature is the incremental, contingent and fragmented character of policy making in modern democracies; and the difficulty in pursuing ‘rational-comprehensive’ approaches to problem solving (Lindblom 1979; Kingdon 1984). It is impossible to anticipate in advance all the consequences from hypothetical CDR projects. Only with time will some impacts be appreciated, and will the benefits and costs of each CDR option be fully understood. Appropriate policy frameworks must therefore 144 Climatic Change (2013) 118:137–149
影响因子：
6.3
作者：
Lenton, T. M.;Vaughan, N. E.
通讯作者：
Vaughan, N. E.