Fingerprinting Attack on the Tor Anonymity System
Fingerprinting Attack on the Tor Anonymity System
复制标题
Tor 匿名系统的指纹攻击
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-642-11145-7_33
复制
发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Kanta Matsuura
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yi Shi;Kanta Matsuura
我们提出了一种针对洋葱路由匿名系统（如Tor）实现指纹攻击的新方法。我们的攻击是一个现实的威胁，因为它可以由一个入口路由器控制器安装，而且需要很少的资源。传统的基于传入流量的指纹攻击由于其流量的复用性和量化性而无法直接对抗Tor。相比之下，我们的新攻击可以通过基于传入和传出数据包的度量来降低Tor的匿名性。此外，我们的方法保留了指纹攻击在所需资源较少方面的现实优势。在评价方面，从实验和理论两方面全面论述了该方法的有效性。为了加强进一步的研究和表明我们的思想的意义，我们还讨论了防御我们的攻击的方法和我们的思想的其他应用。
We present a novel way to implement a fingerprinting attack against Onion Routing anonymity systems such as Tor. Our attack is a realistic threat in the sense that it can be mounted by a single controller of entrance routers and furthermore require very few resources. The conventional fingerprinting attack based on incoming traffic does not work straightforwardly against Tor due to its multiplex and quantized nature of traffic. By contrast, our novel attack can degrade Tor's anonymity by a metric based on both incoming and outgoing packets. In addition, our method keeps the fingerprinting attack's advantage of being realistic in terms of the few required resources. Regarding evaluation, the effectiveness of our method is discussed in a comprehensive manner: experimentally and theoretically. In order to enhance further studies and show the significance of our idea, we also discuss methods for defending against our attack and other applications of our idea.