A common pool theory of supranational deficit ceilings
A common pool theory of supranational deficit ceilings
复制标题
超国家赤字上限的共同池理论
DOI：
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.06.010
复制
发表时间：
2010
影响因子：
2.8
通讯作者：
Charles Wyplosz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Signe Krogstrup;Charles Wyplosz
预算赤字偏差被建模为国内共同池问题和国际外部性的结果。赤字可以用来为非生产性和生产性公共支出提供资金。一个最佳设置的超国家的赤字上限进行检查和福利相比，不受约束的结果和国家设定的赤字上限的情况下。超国家的赤字上限被认为是福利改善相对于类似的国家安排，但并没有完全消除赤字偏见，除非结合国内财政机构允许预先承诺生产性公共支出。
The budget deficit bias is modeled as the result of a domestic common pool problem and of an international externality. Deficits can be used to finance both unproductive and productive public spending. An optimally set supranational deficit ceiling is examined and welfare is compared to the unconstrained outcome and to the case of nationally set deficit ceilings. The supranational deficit ceiling is found to be welfare improving relative to similar national arrangements, but does not fully eliminate the deficit bias unless combined with a domestic fiscal institution allowing for precommitment to productive public spending.