Replicator Dynamics of Evolutionary Hypergames
Replicator Dynamics of Evolutionary Hypergames
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DOI：
10.1109/tsmca.2006.886361
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发表时间：
2003-11
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Takafumi Kanazawa;T. Ushio;Tatsushi Yamasaki
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Takafumi Kanazawa;T. Ushio;Tatsushi Yamasaki
在进化博弈论中，策略在种群中的分布根据个体根据其选择的策略获得的收益而改变。然而，据我们所知，进化游戏中的个人感知被忽视了。通过试错选择策略的个体可能会从不同的角度看待同一冲突情境。因此，必须考虑到个人看法的影响。本文将超对策中的解释函数引入到进化对策中。使用它们，我们制定复制动力学考虑个人的看法。在存在两个种群的特殊情况下，证明了当对应点是超Nash Pareto对时，其内部平衡点是稳定的
In evolutionary game theory, the distribution of strategies in the population is changed according to payoffs which individuals earn depending on their selected strategies. However, to the best of our knowledge, individuals' perceptions in evolutionary games have been disregarded. Individuals that select a strategy by trial and error may perceive the same conflict situation from different viewpoints. Hence, the influence of individuals' perceptions has to be taken into consideration. In this correspondence, interpretation functions in hypergames are introduced into evolutionary games. Using them, we formulate replicator dynamics considering individuals' perceptions. In a special case that there exist two populations, we show that its interior equilibrium point is stable if the corresponding point is a hyper-Nash-Pareto pair