Contracts for venture capital financing with double-sided moral hazard
Contracts for venture capital financing with double-sided moral hazard
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DOI：
10.1007/s11187-018-0028-2
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发表时间：
2019-06
影响因子：
6.4
通讯作者：
Hui Fu;Jun Yang;Yunbi An
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Hui Fu;Jun Yang;Yunbi An
运用纳什讨价还价方法，分析了创业企业中创业者与风险投资家在双边道德风险下的融资契约。我们的研究结果表明，存在一个最优的合同之间的企业家和风险投资家，其中所有的合同实现了一个相同的次优社会状态。在最优契约集合内，存在联合债权-股权融资连续统。当社会总剩余与投资额之比大于某一阈值时，纯股权融资契约存在于最优契约集中。
Using a Nash bargaining approach, we analyze the financing contract between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist with double-sided moral hazard in a start-up enterprise. Our results show that there exists an optimal contract set between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist, in which all contracts achieve an identical second-best social state. Within the optimal contract set, there exists continuum of joint debt-equity financing. The pure equity financing contract exists in the optimal contract set when the ratio of total social surplus to the amount of investment is greater than a threshold.