Efficiency in waste collection markets: Changing relationships between firms, informal workers, and the state in urban India
Efficiency in waste collection markets: Changing relationships between firms, informal workers, and the state in urban India
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DOI：
10.1177/0308518x20913011
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发表时间：
2020-03-12
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
Luthra, Aman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Luthra, Aman
尽管最近的学术研究对印度城市的废物管理私有化提供了丰富的描述，但对私有化的政策模式的起源仍未进行探索。此外，非正式工人在废物管理政策和计划的历史上的地位比现有学术中从非正式到正式过渡的线性描述更为复杂。与对这些转变的现有解释相反，本文将注意力集中在效率的提高上，这是市政关注的一个核心问题，它解释了垃圾收集市场中国家、非正式私营部门和正式私营部门之间关系安排的转变。为了解决他们对服务提供成本的担忧，印度政策制定者通过间接借鉴美国经济学家萨瓦斯的有影响力的工作来证明私有化是合理的，萨瓦斯以经验证明了废物收集市场私有化的效率提高理论。然而，在实践中，非正式系统不仅比正式系统更有效，而且也很符合萨瓦斯关于构建垃圾收集市场的政策处方。因此，效率可以作为保障非正规工人作为合法市场参与者的权利要求的基础。
Although recent scholarship has provided rich accounts of waste management privatization in urban India, the origins of the policy models that informed privatization remain unexplored. Further, the place of informal workers in the history of waste management policy and programs is more complicated than that provided by linear accounts of a transition from informal to formal in the existing scholarship. In contrast to existing explanations of these shifts, this paper draws attention to the rise of efficiency as a core municipal concern that explains the shifting relationship arrangements between the state, the informal private sector, and the formal private sector in waste collection markets. To address their concerns with cost of service delivery, Indian policy-makers justified privatization by indirectly drawing upon the influential work of E.S. Savas, the American economist credited with empirically substantiating the theory of efficiency gains from privatization in waste collection markets. Yet, informal systems are in practice not only more efficient than formal ones, they also conform well to Savas' policy prescriptions for structuring waste collection markets. Efficiency could thus serve as a basis for securing informal workers' claims as legitimate market participants.