Institutional Performance and Vote Buying in India.
Institutional Performance and Vote Buying in India.
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印度的机构绩效和贿选。
DOI：
10.1007/s12116-017-9254-x
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发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
2.7
通讯作者：
Heath O
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Heath O
效率低下和腐败的制度激励公民关注短暂的因果链，这种因果链看重直接的客户交换带来的即时利益，而不是不确定和遥远的方案回报。利用严格控制的比较所产生的分歧，一个国家在印度联邦系统分为两个单位，已表现出显着的差异，在机构发展后司，和一项调查管理的新的国家边界，我们表明，公民更响应于小诱因在薄弱的机构设置，提供基本商品的国家是不太确定的，但这些制度效应会随着诱因的增加而减弱。
Inefficient and corrupt institutions provide an incentive for citizens to focus on short causal chains, which prize instant benefits from direct, clientelist exchanges over the promise of uncertain and distant programmatic rewards. Drawing on a tightly controlled comparison arising from the bifurcation of a state within the Indian federal system into two units that have demonstrated marked differences in institutional development post division, and a survey administered across the new state boundary, we show that citizens are more responsive to small inducements in weak institutional settings where the delivery of basic goods by the state is less certain, but that these institutional effects weaken as the size of the inducement increases.