TRADE WITH HETEROGENEOUS PRIOR BELIEFS AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
TRADE WITH HETEROGENEOUS PRIOR BELIEFS AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
复制标题
利用不同的先验信念和不对称信息进行交易
作者：
S. Morris
“无交易”定理表明，当代理人共享相同的先验信念时，新信息不会导致交易。本文研究了具有异质先验信念的无交易定理的结构。它示出了如何不同的概念下的不对称信息的效率-事前，临时，事后-与代理人的事先信念，以及激励兼容和公共版本的这些效率概念。这些效率的结果被用来刻画在不同的交易环境中的代理人的信念的必要和充分条件，无交易定理。版权所有1994年由计量经济学会。
'No trade' theorems have shown that new information will not lead to trade when agents share the same prior beliefs. This paper explores the structure of no trade theorems with heterogeneous prior beliefs. It is shown how different notions of efficiency under asymmetric information--ex ante, interim, ex post--are related to agents' prior beliefs as well as incentive compatible and public versions of those efficiency concepts. These efficiency results are used to characterize necessary and sufficient conditions on agents' beliefs for no trade theorems in different trading environments. Copyright 1994 by The Econometric Society.