Double DIP: Re-Evaluating Security of Logic Encryption Algorithms

Double DIP: Re-Evaluating Security of Logic Encryption Algorithms
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DOI：
10.1145/3060403.3060469
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发表时间：
2017-05
期刊：
Proceedings of the Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI 2017
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Yuanqi Shen;H. Zhou
Yuanqi Shen;H. Zhou
中科院分区：
其他
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yuanqi Shen;H. Zhou

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逻辑加密是一种硬件安全技术，它使用额外的密钥输入来锁定给定的组合电路。Subramanyan等人最近的一项研究表明，所有现有的逻辑加密技术都可以被成功攻击。作为一种对策，提出了SARLock，以提高现有逻辑推理的安全性。在本文中，我们重新评估这些方法的安全性。提出了一种名为Double DIP的基于SAT的攻击，并证明可以成功击败SARLock增强加密。
Logic encryption is a hardware security technique that uses extra key inputs to lock a given combinational circuit. A recent study by Subramanyan et al. shows that all existing logic encryption techniques can be successfully attacked. As a countermeasure, SARLock was proposed to enhance the security of existing logic encryptions. In this paper, we re-evaluate the security of these approaches. A SAT-based attack called Double DIP is proposed and shown to successfully defeat SARLock-enhanced encryptions.