Electoral Accountability: Recent Theoretical and Empirical Work
Electoral Accountability: Recent Theoretical and Empirical Work
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DOI：
10.1146/annurev-polisci-031710-103823
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发表时间：
2012-01-01
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Ashworth, Scott
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ashworth, Scott
竞争性选举在政策制定者和公民之间创造了一种正式的问责关系。最近的理论研究表明，这种正式的问责制将政策决策与公民偏好联系起来的程度是有限的。特别是，现任者的激励不是由选民对结果的规范性可取性的评价驱动的，而是由关于现任者的类型(例如，能力或意识形态)的结果的信息驱动的。这篇综述既考察了这一理论体系，也考察了它所催生的强有力的实证文献。报告最后简要讨论了正在进行的工作，这些工作试图将这一理论观点与对决策机构的更丰富的看法结合起来。
Competitive elections create a relationship of formal accountability between policy makers and citizens. Recent theoretical work suggests that there are limits on how well this formal accountability links policy decisions to citizen preferences. In particular, incumbents' incentives are driven not by the voters' evaluation of the normative desirability of outcomes but by the outcome's information about the incumbent's type (e.g., competence or ideology). This review surveys both this body of theory and the robust empirical literature it has spawned. It concludes with a short discussion of ongoing work that attempts to integrate this theoretical perspective with a richer view of policy-making institutions.