The Dollar Auction game: a paradox in noncooperative behavior and escalation
The Dollar Auction game: a paradox in noncooperative behavior and escalation
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DOI：
10.1177/002200277101500111
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发表时间：
1971-03
影响因子：
3.1
通讯作者：
M. Shubik
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Shubik
有一个非常简单，非常有趣，而且有教育意义的客厅游戏，可以在任何聚会上通过安排拍卖一美元来玩。这个博弈说明了非合作均衡概念和广义博弈的一些困难（von Neuman and Morgenstern，1945）。这个游戏本身很简单，通常对它的发起人来说是非常有利可图的。拍卖师将一美元的钞票拍卖给出价最高的人，并理解出价最高的人和出价第二高的人都将支付。例如，如果A出价10美分，B出价15美分，那么拍卖师将获得25美分，支付1美元给B，A将失去10美分。假设出价必须是5美分的倍数。此外，假设游戏结束，如果没有人出价一个特定的时间长度。平局的解决有利于最接近拍卖人的投标人。这些规则完全指定了游戏，除了有限结束规则;即，正如所述，可以想象，投标永远不会停止。我们可以在允许任何人出价的金额上加一个上限。然而，分析仅限于没有特定终止点的（可能是无限的）博弈，因为没有
There is an extremely simple, highly amusing, and instructive parlor game which can be played at any party by arranging for the auction of a dollar. This game illustrates some of the difficulties with the noncooperative equilibrium concept and games in extensive form (von Neuman and Morgenstern, 1945). The game is simplicity itself and is usually highly profitable to its promoter. The auctioneer auctions off a dollar bill to the highest bidder, with the understanding that both the highest bidder and the second highest bidder will pay. For example, if A has bid 10 cents and B has bid 15 cents, then the auctioneer will obtain 25 cents, pay a dollar to B, and A will be out 10 cents. Suppose that bids must be made in multiples of 5 cents. Furthermore, suppose that the game ends if no one bids for a specific length of time. Ties are resolved in favor of the bidder closest to the auctioneer. These rules completely specify the game except for a finite end rule; i.e., as specified, bidding could conceivably never cease. We could add an upper limit to the amount that anyone is permitted to bid. However, the analysis is confined to the (possibly infinite) game without a specific termination point, as no