Part-Intrinsicality
Part-Intrinsicality
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部分内在性
DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-0068.2011.00837.x
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Williams J
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Williams J
在某种意义上，生存似乎是一个内在的问题。你是否能在某些事件中幸存下来似乎取决于你自己——环境中发生的事情不应该有什么不同。同样，在某一时刻做一个人似乎是内在的。生存似乎是内在的原则是使个人裂变谜题如此尴尬的一个因素。裂变的情况下，如果生存是一个内在的问题，似乎一个人可以生存两次。但众所周知，“内在性”的标准概念并不能说明生存是内在的，因为“人格”似乎是最大的属性。我们形成了一种感觉，在这种感觉中，生存和人格（也许还有其他最高属性）可能几乎是内在的——一种足以支撑裂变论证的感觉。事实证明，这种“几乎内在性”的概念使我们能够构想出“多数”问题的新版本。
In some sense, survival seems to be an intrinsic matter. Whether or not you survive some event seems to depend on what goes on with you yourself-what happens in the environment shouldn't make a difference. Likewise, being a person at a time seems intrinsic. The principle that survival seems intrinsic is one factor which makes personal fission puzzles so awkward. Fission scenarios present cases where if survival is an intrinsic matter, it appears that an individual could survive twice over. But it's well known that standard notions of" intrinsicality" won't do to articulate the sense in which survival is intrinsic, since'personhooď appears to be a maximal property. We formulate a sense in which survival and personhood (and perhaps other maximal properties) may be almost intrinsic-a sense that would suffice, for example, to ground fission arguments. It turns out that this notion of almost-intrinsicality allows us to formulate a new version of the problem of the many.