PROTOTYPE THEORY AND COMPOSITIONALITY
PROTOTYPE THEORY AND COMPOSITIONALITY
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/0010-0277(94)00659-9
复制
发表时间：
1995-11-01
期刊：
影响因子：
3.4
通讯作者：
PARTEE, B
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
KAMP, H;PARTEE, B
Osherson和Smith（1981，Cognition，11，237-262）讨论了基于原型的简单和复杂概念的意义解释所产生的一些问题。假设这种理论中的概念组合是用模糊逻辑来分析的，他们表明，一些复杂的概念不可避免地会被赋予错误的含义。在本文中，我们认为，O&S发现的许多问题是由于模糊集理论固有的困难，其中大部分消失时，模糊逻辑被超评价理论所取代。然而，即使在这个替换之后，O&S的一个核心问题仍然存在：理论仍然预测一个对象是，比如说，“striped apple”的instance的程度必须小于或等于它是“striped”的instance的程度和它是“apple”的instance的程度，但是这个约束与O&S的实验结果相冲突。本文第二部分探讨了解决这一问题的途径及相关问题。这让我们提出了一些关于原型性和其他机制如何相互作用的区别和原则，这些对于一般语义来说似乎很重要。其中最突出的是：（1）概念的逻辑和语义属性与外延由原型决定的概念和外延与原型性独立的概念之间的语言属性之间的区别。
Osherson and Smith (1981, Cognition, 11, 237-262) discuss a number of problems which arise for a prototype-based account of the meanings of simple and complex concepts. Assuming that concept combination in such a theory is to be analyzed in terms of fuzzy logic, they show that some complex concepts inevitably get assigned the wrong meanings. In the present paper we argue that many of the problems O&S discovered are due to difficulties that are intrinsic to fuzzy set theory, and that most of them disappear when fuzzy logic is replaced by supervaluation theory. However, even after this replacement one of O&S's central problems remains: the theory still predicts that the degree to which an object is an instance of, say, ''striped apple'' must be less than or equal to both the degree to which it is an instance of ''striped'' and the degree to which it is an instance of ''apple'', but this constraint conflicts with O&S's experimental results. The second part of the paper explores ways of solving this and related problems. This leads us to suggest a number of distinctions and principles concerning how prototypicality and other mechanisms interact and which seem important for semantics generally. Prominent among these are (i) the distinction between on the one hand the logical and semantic properties of concepts and on the other the linguistic that between concepts for which the extension is determined by their prototype and concepts for which extension and prototypicality are independent.