A Welfare Analysis of the Electricity Transmission Regulatory Regime in Germany
A Welfare Analysis of the Electricity Transmission Regulatory Regime in Germany
复制标题
德国输电监管制度的福利分析
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2639116
复制
发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Juan Rosellón
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
C. Kemfert;F. Kunz;Juan Rosellón
我们分析了德国当前的输电监管制度，该制度将网络规划与成本加成和收入上限法规相结合。在回顾了输电投资的国际经验后，我们首先对德国的整体制度进行了定性评估。总体而言，德国TSO有过度投资和低效抬高成本的动机。我们进一步开发了两个模型来分析输电规划过程。在第一个模型中，输电扩展和发电调度之间没有权衡。这是一个类似于德国输电规划（Netzentwicklungsplan）中实际使用的建模设置。第二种模型可替代地允许这样的权衡，并且因此代表传输网络规划的最佳方式。两个模型进行了仿真和比较，以说明与当前制度的过度传输容量投资和福利损失的金额。
We analyze the current regulatory regime for electricity transmission in Germany, which combines network planning with both cost-plus and revenue-cap regulations. After reviewing international experiences on transmission investment, we first make a qualitative assessment of the overall German regime. The German TSOs have in general incentives to overinvest and inefficiently inflate costs. We further develop two models to analyze the transmission planning process. In the first model there is no trade-off between transmission expansion and generation dispatch. This is a modeling set-up similar to the one actually used in the German transmission planning (Netzentwicklungsplan). A second model alternatively allows for such a trade-off, and thus represents an optimal way of transmission network planning. Simulations with the two models are carried out and compared so as to illustrate the amount of excessive transmission capacity investment and welfare losses associated with the current regime.