Randomization, communication, and efficiency in repeated games with imperfect public monitoring
Randomization, communication, and efficiency in repeated games with imperfect public monitoring
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公众监督不完善的重复博弈中的随机性、沟通和效率
DOI：
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发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Kandori Michihiro
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Kandori Michihiro
本文表明，如果我们允许玩家之间进行交流，则可以在更弱的假设集下获得不完全（公开）信息下的民间定理（Fudenberg， Levine和Maskin， 1994）。我们的结果特别表明，对于至少有4个参与者的一般对称博弈，我们可以放弃关于动作和信号数量的FLM条件，并在与完美监控情况相同的条件下证明folk定理。（这个摘要是从这个项目的另一个版本借来的。）
The present paper shows that the Folk Theorem under imperfect (public) information (Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994)) can be obtained under much weaker set of assumptions, if we allow communication among players. Our results in particular show that for generic symmetric games with at least four players, we can drop the FLM condition on the number of actions and signals altogether and prove the folk theorem under the same condition as in the perfect monitoring case.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)