Equilibrium selection and consistency
Equilibrium selection and consistency
复制标题
均衡选择和一致性
DOI：
10.1006/game.1996.0014
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发表时间：
1996
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Dries Vermeulen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
H. Norde;J. Potters;Hans Reijnierse;Dries Vermeulen
Abstract In this paper we show that, for two important classes of strategic games, namely the class of mixed extensions of finite games and the class of games with compact and convex strategy spaces and continuous-concave payoff functions, equilibrium selection is incompatible with One Person Rationality, Consistency and (restricted) Non-Emptiness.
