Manager-Specific Effects on Earnings Guidance: An Analysis of Top Executive Turnovers
Manager-Specific Effects on Earnings Guidance: An Analysis of Top Executive Turnovers
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经理对盈利指引的特定影响：高层管理人员更替分析
DOI：
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Sarah E. McVay
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
François Brochet;Lucile Faurel;Sarah E. McVay
我们研究如何管理人员有助于提供盈余指导，通过检查高层管理人员的失误和指导之间的关联。虽然公司和行业的特点是指导的重要决定因素，我们的结论是，首席执行官参与公司层面的政策决定，而首席财务官参与形成或讨论的指导。在历史上频繁发布指导的公司中，首席执行官离职后的指导中断是相对永久性的，可能是由于公司发起的指导政策变化。然而，首席财务官离职后的休息时间可能反映了新任命的高管的不确定性，它们集中在离职后的两个季度，与新任命的首席财务官的背景有关，并延伸到指导的相对精确性。在历史上没有发布指导的公司中，我们发现一些证据表明，新任命的外部聘请的首席执行官增加了提供指导的可能性。
We investigate how managers contribute to the provision of earnings guidance by examining the association between top executive turnovers and guidance. Although firm and industry characteristics are important determinants of guidance, we conclude that CEOs participate in firm-level policy decisions, whereas CFOs are involved in the formation or discussion of guidance. Among firms that historically issued frequent guidance, breaks in guidance following CEO turnovers are relatively permanent and are potentially attributable to firm-initiated changes in guidance policy. Breaks following CFO turnovers, however, likely reflect uncertainty on the part of the newly appointed executive—they are concentrated in the two quarters following the turnover, are associated with the background of the newly appointed CFO, and extend to the relative precision of the guidance. Among firms that did not issue guidance historically, we find some evidence that newly appointed externally hired CEOs increase the likelihood of providing guidance.