SecSMT: Securing SMT Processors against Contention-Based Covert Channels
SecSMT: Securing SMT Processors against Contention-Based Covert Channels
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发表时间：
2022
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通讯作者：
Mohammadkazem Taram;Xida Ren;A. Venkat;D. Tullsen
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作者：
Mohammadkazem Taram;Xida Ren;A. Venkat;D. Tullsen
本文介绍了同时同时使用MulithReaded（SMT）处理器中基于争议的安全漏洞的首次全面分析。它具有整个共享管道中争夺的表征，以及每个资源的潜在泄漏通道。此外，它提出了一套统一的Mitiga-Tion/隔离策略，这些策略会大大削减泄漏，同时保留了大部分不安全的SMT实施的性能。这些结果为考虑SMT执行，其性能优势，即使对安全敏感的应用程序的合理选择奠定了基础。
This paper presents the first comprehensive analysis of contention-based security vulnerabilities in a high-performance simultaneous mulithreaded (SMT) processor. It features a characterization of contention throughout the shared pipeline, and potential resulting leakage channels for each resource. Further, it presents a set of unified mitiga-tion/isolation strategies that dramatically cut that leakage while preserving most of the performance of a full, insecure SMT implementation. These results lay the groundwork for considering SMT execution, with its performance benefits, a reasonable choice even for security-sensitive applications.