Delegation and varieties of capitalism: Explaining the independence of national competition agencies in the European Union
Delegation and varieties of capitalism: Explaining the independence of national competition agencies in the European Union
复制标题
授权和资本主义的多样性：解释欧盟国家竞争机构的独立性
DOI：
10.1057/cep.2013.6
复制
发表时间：
2014
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Mattia Guidi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Mattia Guidi
本文旨在解释为什么尽管欧盟成员国的所有国家竞争主管机构(NCA)都执行相同的法律，但这些机构享有的独立程度存在相关差异。作者提出了一个独创性的理论框架，根据该框架，NCA的独立性取决于一国的经济制度结构。特别是，假设公司在国家市场上运作的方式影响到国家立法者将或多或少的独立性委托给NCA的倾向。所进行的统计分析表明，与其他国家相比，雇主密度较低和较高的两个国家的独立竞争主管机构往往较少。一方面，这些发现支持了各种资本主义学者提出的观点，即自由市场经济和协调市场经济比混合市场经济具有更高的效率。另一方面，所有制度选择都应该与企业的协调方法保持一致的期望并未得到证实。
This article aims to explain why, despite the fact that all national competition authorities (NCAs) in EU member states enforce the same law, relevant differences exist in the degree of independence that these agencies enjoy. The author advances an original theoretical framework according to which the decision on the independence of NCAs depends on the structure of the economic system of a country. In particular, it is hypothesized that the means by which firms operate in the national market affects the tendency of national legislators to delegate more or less independence to the NCA. The statistical analysis carried out shows that both countries with low and high levels of employer density tend to have less independent competition authorities than those of other countries. On the one hand, the findings support the argument, advanced by varieties-of-capitalism scholars, that liberal market economies and coordinated market economies achieve greater efficiency than mixed market economies. On the other, the expectation that all institutional choices should be coherent with the firms’ coordination method is not confirmed.