Bayesian Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Persistent State, with Application to Security Games
Bayesian Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Persistent State, with Application to Security Games
复制标题
具有持久状态的贝叶斯重复零和博弈及其在安全博弈中的应用
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-030-64946-3_31
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发表时间:
2020
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Dughmi, Shaddin
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Conitzer, Vincent;Deng, Yuan;Dughmi, Shaddin
We study infinitely-repeated two-player zero-sum games with one-sided private information and a persistent state. Here, only one of the two players learns the state of the repeated game. We consider two models: either the state is chosen by nature, or by one of the players. For the former, the equilibrium of the repeated game is known to be equivalent to that of a one-shot public signaling game, and we make this equivalence algorithmic. For the latter, we show equivalence to one-shot team max-min games, and also provide an algorithmic reduction. We apply this framework to repeated zero-sum security games with private information on the side of the defender and provide an almost complete characterization of their computational complexity.
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DOI:
--
发表时间:
2017
期刊:
SeCO Workshops
影响因子:
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作者:
S. Dughmi
通讯作者:
S. Dughmi
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2010
期刊:
Annual Conference Computational Learning Theory
影响因子:
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作者:
Jacob D. Abernethy;P. Bartlett;Elad Hazan
通讯作者:
Elad Hazan
DOI:
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发表时间:
2015
期刊:
IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
影响因子:
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作者:
Yu Cheng;Ho Yee Cheung;S. Dughmi;E. Emamjomeh;Lining Han;S. Teng
通讯作者:
S. Teng
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2019
期刊:
Games Econ. Behav.
影响因子:
--
作者:
S. Dughmi
通讯作者:
S. Dughmi
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-319-68711-7_24
发表时间:
2017
期刊:
Eur. J. Oper. Res.
影响因子:
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作者:
Haifeng Xu;Benjamin J. Ford;Fei Fang;B. Dilkina;A. Plumptre;Milind Tambe;M. Driciru;F. Wanyama;A. Rwetsiba;Mustapha Nsubaga;Joshua Mabonga
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Joshua Mabonga