Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Substance*
Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Substance*
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特定服装的细节：物质的三种比喻理论*
DOI：
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发表时间：
1994
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
P. Simons
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
P. Simons
当我们谈论或想到任何特定种类的可感知物质时，如马、石头等，尽管我们对它们中的任何一个的观念，只是那些具有可感知性质的简单观念的复杂化或集合，我们发现这些简单观念在称为马或石头的东西中是统一的，然而，因为我们无法想象它们如何单独存在，也不能相互依存，我们假设它们存在于，我们用实体这个名称来表示这种支持，虽然这是肯定的，但我们对我们认为是支持的东西没有明确的或明显的观念。(John洛克，《论人类理解》，第二卷，第二十三章，4.）
[W]hen we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal Substances, as Horse, Stone, etc. though the Idea, we have of either of them, be but the Complication, or Collection of those several simple Ideas of sensible Qualities, which Ae find united in the thing called Horse or Stone, yet because we cannot conceive, how they should subsist alone, nor one in another, we suppose them existing in, and supported by some common subject; which Support we denote by the name Substance, though it be certain, we have no clear, or distinct Idea of that thing we suppose a Support. (John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Chapter XXIII, ?4.)