A Theory of Expropriation and Deviations from Perfect Capital Mobility
A Theory of Expropriation and Deviations from Perfect Capital Mobility
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征用理论与完美资本流动性的偏差
DOI：
10.2307/2232213
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发表时间：
1982
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Mark Gersovitz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Eaton;Mark Gersovitz
本文发展了一种存在潜在征用的资本运动理论。征收的威胁来源于东道国的效用最大化行为。潜在的投资者预见到这种行为，修改他们的投资计划，以避免征用。当东道国面对有竞争力的外国投资者时，征用代表了基德兰和普雷斯科特（1977）所讨论的那种时间一致但次优的计划的一部分。由此产生的平衡可能以若干扭曲为特征。在我们分析的最简单的模型中，东道国面临着大量潜在的、有竞争力的外国投资者。我们探讨了征用威胁对东道国影子定价和潜在投资者最佳技术选择的影响。我们考虑了模型的各种变体，其中潜在投资者相对于东道国处于垄断地位，其中外国投资项目面临在征收决策时未解决的风险，以及影响东道国征收最优性的因素在投资决策时未解决。在征收的情况下，东道国承担的惩罚越大，在简单的竞争模式下，它的福利就越大。然而，当外国投资者是垄断者时，结果就相反了。
This paper develops a theory of capital movements in the presence of potential expropriation. The threat of expropriation is derived from utility maximizing behavior by host countries. Potential investors, anticipating this behavior, modify their investment plans to avoid expropriation. When- ever the host country faces competitive foreign investors expropriation represents part of a time-consistent but suboptimal plan of the type discussed by Kydland and Prescott (1977). The consequent equilibrium may be characterized by a number of distortions. In the simplest model we analyze, a host country faces a large number of potential, competitive foreign investors. We explore the implications of the threat of expropriation for shadow pricing in the host country and for the optimal technology choice by potential investors. We consider variants of the model in which the potential investor is in a monopoly position vis-a-vis the host country, in which the foreign investment project is subject to risk which is unresolved at the time of the expropriation decision, and in which factors affecting the optimality of expropriation by the host country are unresolved at the time of the investment decision. The larger the penalty incumbent on the host country in the event of expropriation, the greater its welfare in the simple, competitive model. When the foreign investor is a monopolist, however, this result is reversed.