Protecting elections by recounting ballots
Protecting elections by recounting ballots
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DOI：
10.1016/j.artint.2020.103401
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发表时间：
2021-01-01
影响因子：
14.4
通讯作者：
Voudouris，Alexandros A.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Elkind，Edith;Gan，Jiarui;Voudouris，Alexandros A.
投票操纵的复杂性是计算社会选择中的一个重要课题。在这项工作中，我们考虑了两个阶段的投票操纵的情况。首先，恶意的一方（攻击者）试图通过改变某些投票区的投票计数来操纵选举结果，以支持首选候选人。之后，另一个关心选民意愿的政党（一个捍卫者）要求在一个被操纵的选区重新计票，将选票恢复到原来的价值。我们调查由此产生的Stackelberg游戏的情况下，投票汇总使用两个变种的复数规则，并获得一个几乎完整的图片的复杂性景观，无论是从攻击者的和从防御者的角度来看。
Complexity of voting manipulation is a prominent topic in computational social choice. In this work, we consider a two-stage voting manipulation scenario. First, a malicious party (an attacker) attempts to manipulate the election outcome in favor of a preferred candidate by changing the vote counts in some of the voting districts. Afterwards, another party (a defender), which cares about the voters' wishes, demands a recount in a subset of the manipulated districts, restoring their vote counts to their original values. We investigate the resulting Stackelberg game for the case where votes are aggregated using two variants of the Plurality rule, and obtain an almost complete picture of the complexity landscape, both from the attacker's and from the defender's perspective.