Cooperation vs. Collusion: How Essentiality Shapes Co-opetition ∗
Cooperation vs. Collusion: How Essentiality Shapes Co-opetition ∗
复制标题
合作与共谋：本质如何塑造合作竞争*
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Tirole
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Rey;J. Tirole
该文件作出了两个相关的贡献。首先，与丰富的身体的文学（主要是完美的）替代品的勾结，它得出的一般结果的可持续性的默契协调一类嵌套的需求函数，允许完全替代品和完善的补充之间的全方位。其次，它研究了联合营销联盟的可取性，一种替代合并。它表明，结合两个信息自由的监管要求，强制分拆的联合营销实体和不受约束的独立营销的公司，使联合营销联盟总是社会可取的，是否默契的协调是可行的或不。
The paper makes two related contributions. First, and in contrast with the rich body of literature on collusion with (mainly perfect) substitutes, it derives general results on the sustainability of tacit coordination for a class of nested demand functions that allows for the full range between perfect substitutes and perfect complements. Second, it studies the desirability of joint marketing alliances, an alternative to mergers. It shows that a combination of two informationfree regulatory requirements, mandated unbundling by the joint marketing entity and unfettered independent marketing by the firms, makes joint-marketing alliances always socially desirable, whether tacit coordination is feasible or not.
影响因子：
6.1
作者：
ABREU, D
通讯作者：
ABREU, D