Strategic thinking in public goods games with teams
Strategic thinking in public goods games with teams
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.03.007
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发表时间：
2018-05-01
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
Stoddard, Brock
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Cox, Caleb A.;Stoddard, Brock
我们通过实验研究了重复公共产品游戏中的团队行为，并使用团队聊天记录来研究贡献的动机。受试者被分成两人小组，每个小组在每个阶段共同做出决定。我们将团队与个人进行比较，发现总体贡献相似。然而，团队的初始贡献更高，残局效应更明显。我们研究了团队内部的战略讨论，发现了对重复博弈效应和有限逆向归纳的关注的有力证据。我们还发现了混淆的证据，并探索其潜在来源。(C)2018爱思唯尔B.V.保留所有权利。
We experimentally investigate team behavior in repeated public goods games and use team chat logs to study motives for contribution. Subjects are matched into two-person teams, and each team makes a joint decision in each period. We compare teams with individuals and find similar overall contributions. However, initial contribution is higher and endgame effects are more pronounced for teams. We examine strategic discussions within teams and find strong evidence of concern for repeated game effects and limited backward induction. We also find evidence of confusion and explore its potential sources. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.