Many Many Problems
Many Many Problems
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很多很多问题
DOI：
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发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
B. Weatherson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
B. Weatherson
超价值主义者对“多数人的问题”的解决方案通常依赖于两个原则。首先，问题的根源在于单数术语可能是模糊的，就像谓词一样。第二，超赋值论者对含有模糊谓词的难题提出的解决办法，也可以解决含有模糊单数项的难题。近年来，这第二个原则受到了来自多个方面的攻击：有人声称，超赋值主义者对模糊奇异项的解释不能解释模糊奇异项在命题态度报告中的作用，不能解释不同奇异项之间的半影联系，也不能允许模糊奇异项是直接指称的。虽然这些论点中的一些是成功的反对现存的超估价主义理论，我提供了一些自然的超估价主义的修改，以避免挑战。
Supervaluationist solutions to ‘the problem of the many’ typically rely on two principles. First, the root of the problem is that singular terms can be vague, just as predicates can be. Secondly, the same resolution as the supervaluationist suggests for puzzles with vague predicates will resolve puzzles concerning vague singular terms. In recent years this second principle has been attacked from a number of fronts: it has been claimed that supervaluationist accounts of vague singular terms cannot explain the role of vague singular terms in propositional attitude reports, cannot explain penumbral connections between distinct singular terms, and cannot allow that vague singular terms are directly referential. While some of these arguments are successful against extant supervaluationist theories, I offer some natural modifications to supervaluationism which avoid the challenges.