Ecological Dumping under Monopolistic Competition
Ecological Dumping under Monopolistic Competition
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垄断竞争下的生态倾销
DOI：
10.1111/1467-9442.00266
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发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Michael Pflüger
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Michael Pflüger
在考虑资本流动的垄断竞争模型中，分析了污染外部性具有区域性的两国政府对排污税的竞争选择。假设政府没有其他的政策工具，除了排放税在他们的处置，我表明，政府选择低（高）税，如果排放在生产中的重要性是小（大）相对于运输成本和加价。与以前的文献相比，污染的边际负效用不是将排放税的非合作选择与社会规划者的选择分开的参数之一。版权所有2001年由斯堪的纳维亚经济学杂志的编辑。
The competitive choice of emission taxes by two governments is analysed in a model of monopolistic competition with capital mobility where pollution externalities are regional. Assuming that governments have no other policy instrument apart from emission taxes at their disposal, I show that governments choose inefficiently low (high) taxes if the importance of emissions in production is small (large) relative to transport costs and the mark-up. In contrast to the previous literature, the marginal disutility of pollution is not among the parameters which separate the non-cooperative choice of emission taxes from the social planner's choice. Copyright 2001 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.