Parallel Imports and Price Controls
Parallel Imports and Price Controls
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平行进口和价格控制
DOI：
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
E. Lai
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
G. Grossman;E. Lai
价格控制为国际套利创造了机会。许多人认为，如果容忍这种套利行为，将损害知识产权，并削弱对制药等研究密集型行业的投资激励。我们挑战这种正统的观点，并表明，相反，创新的步伐往往是在一个世界上与知识产权的国际用尽比在一个国家用尽更快。我们得出结论的关键是要认识到，当贸易伙伴允许平行进口时，政府将做出不同的价格控制选择。
Price controls create opportunities for international arbitrage. Many have argued that such arbitrage, if tolerated, will undermine intellectual property rights and dull the incentives for investment in research-intensive industries such as pharmaceuticals. We challenge this orthodox view and show, to the contrary, that the pace of innovation often is faster in a world with international exhaustion of intellectual property rights than in one with national exhaustion. The key to our conclusion is to recognize that governments will make different choices of price controls when parallel imports are allowed by their trade partners than they will when they are not.