Educating Voters for Protection
Educating Voters for Protection
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教育选民保护
DOI：
10.1080/09638199.2014.926385
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发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
2.1
通讯作者：
Hisashi Sawaki
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kyoji Fukao;Jean-Pascal Bassino;Tatsuji Makino;Ralph Paprzycki;Tokihiko Settsu;Masanori Takashima;Joji Tokui;Hisashi Sawaki;Hisashi Sawaki
本文分析了一个农业压力集团为保护他们的工业而进行的宣传活动。如果该集团知道其产品的国内生产的正外部性，他们可能会在选举前教育选民，以诱导有利的贸易政策。对这种情况进行建模表明，此类活动的支出是真实外部性的凸函数。它还表明，当农民人口相对较多时，人口的边际下降使人均运动努力更加强烈;然而，当农民人口变少时，进一步下降使努力不那么强烈。
This paper analyzes an agricultural pressure group's publicity campaigns for protection of their industry. If the group knows the positive externalities of domestic production of their goods, they may educate voters on these before an election to induce a favored trade policy. Modeling this situation shows that the expenditure on such campaigns is an increasing convex function of the true externalities. It also shows that, when the farmer population is relatively large, a marginal decline in that population makes the per-capita campaign effort more intense; however, when the farmer population becomes small, a further decline makes the effort less intense.