Making global markets: Historical institutionalism in international political economy
Making global markets: Historical institutionalism in international political economy
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打造全球市场：国际政治经济中的历史制度主义
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Abraham L. Newman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
H. Farrell;Abraham L. Newman
正如全球金融危机所显著证明的那样，国内监管体系的相互作用具有重大的国际后果。然而，这些关系只受到国际关系学者的有限关注。因此，本期特刊详细审查了国际市场监管，即国家和其他行为者的国内监管活动为国际市场制定有效规则的过程。为此，我们借用并扩展了历史制度主义者在比较政治学和美国政治发展方面的论点。特别是，这些贡献采用了两种机制——政策反馈和相对顺序——来解释国家和官僚机构对国际市场监管的偏好，以及相关谈判中的议价能力。除了为国际政治经济学中心关于国际经济治理的辩论做出贡献外，个人的贡献还揭示了一些重要的实证领域，如公司会计、知识产权、制药、对冲基金和金融市场标准化。
ABSTRACT As dramatically evidenced by the global financial crisis, the interaction of domestic regulatory systems has significant international consequences. Nevertheless, these relationships have received only limited attention from international relations scholars. This special issue, therefore, provides a detailed examination of international market regulation – the processes through which the domestic regulatory activities of states and other actors set the effective rules of internationally-exposed markets. To this end, we borrow and extend on arguments developed by historical institutionalists in comparative politics and American political development. In particular, the contributions adapt two mechanisms – policy feedbacks and relative sequencing – to explain state and bureaucratic preferences over international market regulation as well as bargaining strength in relevant negotiations. In addition to contributing to central IPE debates about international economic governance, the individual contributions shed light on a number of important empirical domains such as corporate accounting, intellectual property, pharmaceuticals, hedge funds, and financial market standardization.