Robust countermeasure against detector control attack in a practical quantum key distribution system
Robust countermeasure against detector control attack in a practical quantum key distribution system
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DOI：
10.1364/optica.6.001178
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发表时间：
2019-09
期刊：
影响因子：
10.4
通讯作者：
Yong-Jun Qian;De-Yong He;Shuang Wang;Wei Chen;Z. Yin;G. Guo;Z. Han
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yong-Jun Qian;De-Yong He;Shuang Wang;Wei Chen;Z. Yin;G. Guo;Z. Han
在量子密钥分发(QKD)的现实实现中，具有不想要的缺陷的物理系统会被窃听者利用。基于探测器的缺陷，探测器控制攻击已经在几个量子密钥分发系统上被成功地发起，并引起了广泛的关注。这里，我们提出了一种通过在检测器前引入可变衰减器来对抗这些攻击的稳健对策。这种对抗不仅对盲光攻击有效，而且对隐蔽性更强、威胁性更强的非盲光攻击也具有较强的鲁棒性。与以往的技术改进不同，我们的对抗模型将单光子探测器视为一个黑匣子，通过统计QKD系统的检测率和误码率来检测窃听者。除了理论证明外，该对策还得到了实验论证的支持。我们的对策是一般性的，它与探测器的技术细节无关，并且可以很容易地应用于现有的量子密钥分发系统。
In real-life implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD), the physical systems with unwanted imperfections would be exploited by an eavesdropper. Based on imperfections in the detectors, detector-control attacks have been successfully launched on several QKD systems and attracted widespread concerns. Here, we propose a robust countermeasure against these attacks just by introducing a variable attenuator in front of the detector. This countermeasure is not only effective against attacks with blinding light, but it is also robust against attacks without blinding light, which are more concealed and threatening. Different from previous technical improvements, the single-photon detector in our countermeasure model is treated as a black box, and the eavesdropper can be detected by statistics of the detection and error rates of the QKD system. Besides theoretical proof, the countermeasure is also supported by an experimental demonstration. Our countermeasure is general in the sense that it is independent of the technical details of the detector, and can be easily applied to existing QKD systems.