Additionality, Transactional Barriers and the Political Economy of Climate Change
Additionality, Transactional Barriers and the Political Economy of Climate Change
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.123789
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发表时间：
1998-01
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
T. Heller
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
T. Heller
将温室气体稳定在可持续水平是气候变化框架公约的目标。实现这一目标的战略一直是激烈辩论的对象。本文关注的是一个受到审查的排放交易体系——联合实施（JI）。联合减排的基本前提是，一个缔约方可以通过资助另一个缔约方的减排来履行其控制排放的义务。这种方法可以优化获得成本最低的缓解办法的机会，并预测即使在没有集中确定普遍配额的情况下也会有集体参与。JI的一个关键问题是附加性的概念。“一切照旧”的轨迹提供了衡量附加性的基线。对基线的准确估计需要适当考虑制度和组织的交易成本。因此，实施将联合创新作为核心要素的气候变化体系，需要对快速增长经济体基础设施发展模式背后的激励因素和障碍有更深入的了解。读者应该注意到，本文所有与JI相关的分析和结论同样适用于《京都议定书》第12条建立的新的清洁发展机制。
Stabilization of greenhouse gases at sustainable levels is the objective of the FCCC. Strategies to achieve this aim have been the object of intense debate. This paper focuses on one emissions trading system under scrutiny, Joint Implementation (JI). The basic premise of JI is that one nation party can satisfy its obligations to control emissions by financing emission mitigation in another nation party. Such an approach can optimize access to least cost mitigation options, and predicts collective participation even in the absence of centralized determination of universal quotas. A key issue for JI is the concept of additionality. "Business as usual" trajectories provide a baseline against which additionality is measured. Accurate estimation of baselines needs to take into proper account institutional and organizational transaction costs. Hence, the implementation of a climate change system incorporating JI as a core element requires a greater understanding of the incentives and barriers that underlie the patterns of infrastructure development in rapidly growing economies. Readers should note that all of this paper's analyses and conclusions related to JI apply equally to the new clean development mechanism established by article 12 of the Kyoto protocol.