Service segment competition: size or value, which matters?

Service segment competition: size or value, which matters?
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DOI:
10.1080/00207543.2020.1722328
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发表时间:
2020-01
影响因子:
9.2
通讯作者:
Weixiang Huang;Wenhui Zhou;Pengfei Guo;Han Zhu
Weixiang Huang;Wenhui Zhou;Pengfei Guo;Han Zhu
中科院分区:
工程技术2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Weixiang Huang;Wenhui Zhou;Pengfei Guo;Han Zhu

文献摘要

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我们研究了由两家公司组成的服务市场:一家提供常规服务,另一家提供优质服务。客户在评估服务水平时对延迟敏感且异构。我们研究了两种细分营销策略不同的竞争游戏。一种是基于规模的竞争,即企业在细分市场规模维度上进行竞争;另一种是基于价值的竞争,即企业在细分目标(关于客户评价)维度上进行竞争。对于这两种博弈,纳什均衡始终存在,并且(帕累托主导)均衡是唯一的。有趣的是,在基于价值的游戏中,优质服务提供商的有效到达率可以比其竞争对手的服务率有所提高。此外,我们捕捉了均衡市场作为垄断或双头垄断的条件,并表明基于规模的竞争有助于维持服务多样性。我们还表明,基于价值的游戏中价格有所降低;与基于规模的游戏相比,优质(常规)服务提供商在基于价值的游戏中为更多(更少)的客户提供服务。我们的结果表明,基于价值的竞争更加激烈,因为所服务的客户数量、客户剩余和社会福利更高,而基于价值的竞争中两家公司的总收入低于基于规模的竞争。
We study a service market with two firms: one that provides regular and another that provides premium services. Customers are delay sensitive and heterogeneous in evaluating the service level. We study two competition games that differ in segmentation-marketing strategies. One is the size-based competition in which firms compete on the segment size dimension, and the other is the value-based competition in which firms compete on the segment target (regarding customer valuation) dimension. For both games, the Nash equilibrium always exists, and the (Pareto dominant) equilibrium is unique. Interestingly, the premium service provider's effective arrival rate can be increasing in its competitor's service rate in the value-based game. Moreover, we capture the conditions for the equilibrium market as either a monopoly or a duopoly and show that size-based competition helps sustain service variety. We also show that the prices are reduced in the value-based game; the premium (regular) service provider serves more (fewer) customers in the value-based game than in the size-based game. Our results show that value-based competition is more intensive in the sense that the number of customers who are served, customer surplus and social welfare are higher, while the total revenue of two firms is lower in the value-based competition than in the size-based competition.