Leveled Fully Homomorphic Signcryption From Lattices

Leveled Fully Homomorphic Signcryption From Lattices
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DOI:
10.1109/access.2023.3264497
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发表时间:
2023
期刊:
影响因子:
3.9
通讯作者:
Xiaodan Jin;Fuqun Wang;Renjun Zhang;Bin Lian;Kefei Chen
Xiaodan Jin;Fuqun Wang;Renjun Zhang;Bin Lian;Kefei Chen
中科院分区:
计算机科学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Xiaodan Jin;Fuqun Wang;Renjun Zhang;Bin Lian;Kefei Chen

文献摘要

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随着云计算、大数据和物联网的持续快速发展,对数据的同态性、隐私性和完整性进行保护变得极为关键。为此,Rezaeibagha等人提出了一种新的密码原语,称为同态签密。然而,目前的同态签密方案要么只支持线性计算,要么是建立在非标准假设上。因此,从标准假设出发设计一个层次化的全同态签密方案是一个有趣的问题。在这项工作中,我们提出了一个层次的FHSC计划从格。为此,我们运用经典的先签名后加密的方法,通过对每个元素加密的方式,克服了同态乘法运算的困难。此外,我们还证明了它对选择明文攻击的不可伪造性(IND-CPA)和在标准格的困难问题下的强不可伪造性(SUF)。
With the continuous and rapid development of Cloud Computing, Big Data and Internet of Things, it is extremely critical to protect data with homomorphism, privacy and integrity. For this, Rezaeibagha et al. proposed a new cryptographic primitive, called homomorphic signcryption. However, the current homomorphic signcryption schemes either only support linear computation or are built on non-standard assumption. Therefore, it is interesting to design a leveled fully homomorphic signcryption (FHSC) scheme from the standard assumption. In this work, we present a leveled FHSC scheme from lattices. For this, we exert classical sign-then-encrypt method and surmount the difficulty of homomorphic multiplicative evaluation in the way of encrypting every elements. Moreover, we prove its indistinguishability against chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) and strong unforgeability (SUF) under hard problems of standard lattices.