Taxation, Information, and Withholding: Evidence from Costa Rica
Taxation, Information, and Withholding: Evidence from Costa Rica
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税收、信息和预扣税：哥斯达黎加的证据
DOI：
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. Hernandez
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Anne Brockmeyer;M. Hernandez
本文研究了企业销售的预扣税，这是一种广泛使用的合规机制，但被公共财政理论所忽视。在具有第三方报告的标准逃税模型中引入了预扣计划，即交易中的付款人向收款人征收税款。如果纳税人能够全额收回扣缴的税款，扣缴与她的逃税决定无关。然而，在存在回收成本高昂、执法力度不够或保证金合规性存在较大差距的情况下，预扣税可能会增加纳税额。为了从实证角度证明这一点，该研究利用了哥斯达黎加 40 万家公司的十年所得税和销售税记录，以及超过 2000 万份第三方信息和预扣税报告。首先，对合规性的剖析表明，企业在广度、集约度和支付保证金方面对第三方信息的遵守程度相对较高。一项事件研究表明，第三方报告的覆盖导致报告的应税收入增加 20-50%。最后，预扣税率增加的双重差分和回归不连续性估计隔离了预扣税的影响。预扣税率加倍后，受处理企业的销售税缴纳量将增加 33%，销售税总额将增加 8%。该机制减少了误报和预扣税款不完全退还的情况。预扣税对合规性产生的巨大影响使其在低合规性环境中的广泛使用合理化。
This paper studies tax withholding on business sales, a widely used compliance mechanism which is ignored by public finance theory. A withholding scheme, whereby the payer in a transaction collects tax from the payee, is introduced in a standard evasion model with third-party reporting. If the taxpayer can fully reclaim the tax withheld, withholding is irrelevant to her evasion decision. However, in the presence of costly reclaim, low salience of enforcement or extensive margin compliance gaps, withholding can raise tax payment. To show this empirically, the study exploits a ten-year panel of income tax and sales tax records from 400,000 firms in Costa Rica, and over 20 million third-party information and withholding reports. First, an anatomy of compliance shows that firms are relatively compliant with third-party information on the extensive, intensive and payment margin. An event study then shows that coverage by third-party reporting leads to a 20-50 percent increase in reported taxable income. Finally, a difference-in-difference and regression discontinuity estimation of a withholding rate increase isolates the impact of withholding. A doubling of the withholding rate leads to a 33 percent increase in sales tax payment among treated firms and an 8 percent increase in aggregate sales tax revenue. The mechanisms are reduced misreporting and incomplete reclaim of the tax withheld. The large compliance impact of withholding rationalizes its widespread use in low compliance contexts.
DOI：
10.1093/qje/qjr013
发表时间：
2011-05-01
期刊：
The quarterly journal of economics
影响因子：
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作者：
Chetty R;Friedman JN;Olsen T;Pistaferri L
通讯作者：
Pistaferri L