The promotion of cooperation by the poor in dynamic chicken games.
The promotion of cooperation by the poor in dynamic chicken games.
复制标题
DOI：
10.1038/srep43377
复制
发表时间：
2017-02-24
影响因子：
4.6
通讯作者：
Yoshimura J
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ito H;Katsumata Y;Hasegawa E;Yoshimura J
合作行为的演化是博弈论中的重要问题之一。先前的研究表明，合作只能在非常有限的条件下进化，并且已经对游戏进行了各种修改来解释合作的进化。最近，博弈论基础上的效用函数被证明依赖于当前财富作为效用理论动态版本中的条件（状态）变量。在这里，我们将这个动态效用函数引入到几个游戏中。在一定条件下，在老鹰-鸽子博弈和雪堆博弈中，穷人会表现出合作行为，而在囚徒困境博弈和猎鹿博弈中则不会。这一结果表明，合作可以表现出穷人在一些鸡游戏。因此，合作的演变可能不像以前的研究所建议的那样有限。
The evolution of cooperative behavior is one of the most important issues in game theory. Previous studies have shown that cooperation can evolve only under highly limited conditions, and various modifications have been introduced to games to explain the evolution of cooperation. Recently, a utility function basic to game theory was shown to be dependent on current wealth as a conditional (state) variable in a dynamic version of utility theory. Here, we introduce this dynamic utility function to several games. Under certain conditions, poor players exhibit cooperative behavior in two types of chicken games (the hawk-dove game and the snowdrift game) but not in the prisoner’s dilemma game and the stag hunt game. This result indicates that cooperation can be exhibited by the poor in some chicken games. Thus, the evolution of cooperation may not be as limited as has been suggested in previous studies.