The Decider's Dilemma: Leader Culpability, War Outcomes, and Domestic Punishment
The Decider's Dilemma: Leader Culpability, War Outcomes, and Domestic Punishment
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DOI：
10.1017/s0003055411000219
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发表时间：
2011-08-01
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
Croco, Sarah E.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Croco, Sarah E.
一个领导人将他的国家卷入冲突的罪责既影响了他对战争结束的计算，也影响了他的国内听众在他失败时惩罚他的意愿。我把一个有罪的领导人定义为任何一个领导人，他要么主持了一场战争的开始，要么在战争中期上台，并与一个有罪的前任有着政治联系。使用专门为这项研究创建的数据集，我发现有罪的领导人比无罪的领导人更有可能实现有利的战争结果。我还发现，国内观众愿意惩罚失败的有罪领导人，但宽恕做同样事情的无罪领导人。总的来说，我的发现强调了更充分地理解个别领导人在将国家带入战争中所扮演的角色的必要性。
A leader's culpability for involving his state in a conflict affects both his war termination calculus and his domestic audience's willingness to punish him if he loses. I define a culpable leader as any leader who either presides over the beginning of a war, or comes to power midwar and shares a political connection with a culpable predecessor. Using a data set created specifically for this study, I find that culpable leaders are more likely than nonculpable ones to achieve favorable war outcomes. I also find that domestic audiences will be willing to punish culpable leaders who lose, yet spare nonculpable leaders who do the same. Taken together, my findings underscore the need to appreciate more fully the role individual leaders play in bringing their states to war.