International Bureaucrats and Organizational Performance. Country-Specific Knowledge and Sectoral Knowledge in World Bank Projects

International Bureaucrats and Organizational Performance. Country-Specific Knowledge and Sectoral Knowledge in World Bank Projects
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国际官僚和组织绩效。

DOI:
10.1093/isq/sqac013
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发表时间:
2022
影响因子:
2.6
通讯作者:
Mirko Heinzel
Mirko Heinzel
中科院分区:
法学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Mirko Heinzel

文献摘要

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国际组织 (IO) 试图将特定政策的最佳实践和特定国家的知识结合起来,以增强明智的决策。然而,这两种知识对组织绩效的相对贡献还没有得到充分的了解。本文通过关注工作人员在世界银行绩效中的作用来解决这一差距。它假定特定国家的知识、部门知识及其组合对世界银行的项目做出积极贡献。这一论点利用一个关于世界银行任务组负责人的任期、国籍和教育背景的新颖数据库进行了检验。三个发现很引人注目。首先,平均而言,特定国家的知识似乎很重要,而部门知识则不然。其次,有证据表明,结合这两种知识的员工能够为绩效做出更积极的贡献。第三,经验的多样性和相关性,而不是任期的长度,与更多的成功相关。研究结果强调了个别工作人员的知识差异如何影响他们的决策和绩效,从而有助于对国际官僚机构的讨论。 IO 可以更好地利用其官僚机构的现有资源,通过减少工作地点之间的轮换频率来提高绩效。
International organizations (IOs) try to incorporate policy-specific best practices and country-specific knowledge to increase well-informed decision-making. However, the relative contribution of the two kinds of knowledge to organizational performance is insufficiently understood. The article addresses this gap by focusing on the role of staff in World Bank performance. It posits that country-specific knowledge, sectoral knowledge, and their combination positively contribute to World Bank projects. The argument is tested drawing on a novel database on the tenure, nationality, and educational background of World Bank Task Team Leaders. Three findings stand out. First, country-specific knowledge seems to matter on average, while sectoral knowledge does not. Second, there is some evidence that staff that combine both kinds of knowledge are empowered to make more positive contributions to performance. Third, the diversity and relevance of experience, not length of tenure, are associated with more success. The findings contribute to discussions on international bureaucracies by highlighting how differences between the knowledge of individual staff shape their decision-making and performance. IOs could better tap into the existing resources in their bureaucracies to enhance their performance by rotating staff less frequently between duty stations.