Genetic exceptionalism and legislative pragmatism.
Genetic exceptionalism and legislative pragmatism.
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遗传例外论和立法实用主义。
DOI:
10.1111/j.1748-720x.2007.00154.x
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发表时间:
2007
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Rothstein,MarkA
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
Rothstein,MarkA
One of the most important and contentious policy issues surrounding genetics is whether genetic information should be treated separately from other medical information. The view that genetics raises distinct issues is what Thomas Murray labeled “genetic exceptionalism,” borrowing from the earlier term “HIV exceptional-ism.” 1 The issue of whether the use of genetic information should be addressed separately from other health information is not merely an academic concern, however. Since the Human Genome Project began in 1990, nearly every state has enacted legislation prohibiting genetic discrimination in health insurance; two-thirds of the states have enacted laws prohibiting genetic discrimination in employment, and other state laws have been enacted dealing with genetic discrimination in life insurance, genetic privacy, and genetic testing. 2 Bills in Congress also would prohibit genetic discrimination in health insurance and employment. 3 Much has been written on the issue. 4 Most commentators have cautioned against genetic exceptionalism, but to no avail. 5 Legislators seem enamored of geneticspecific laws, and it is possible that they actually believe that genetic-specific laws are the best way to protect privacy and combat discrimination. Or perhaps they just think such laws are better than none at all, even though they recognize that the laws are flawed conceptually and in practice. Many legislators who hold the latter view undoubtedly have also concluded that more general laws dealing with such contentious issues as access to health care and employment discrimination have little chance of being passed. After considering the arguments in favor of and opposed to genetic exceptionalism, I argue in this article that genetic exceptionalism represents poor public policy. Because more desirable and far-reaching “generic” laws are often politically infeasible, legislators may still reasonably decide that it is better to enact a genetic-specific law than nothing at all. But there are only limited conditions in which that decision is reasonable.