Civil conflict and secessions
Civil conflict and secessions
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国内冲突和分裂
DOI：
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Enrico Spolaore
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Enrico Spolaore
本文研究的是作为地区冲突结果的分离。我们研究在什么条件下，各地区将把昂贵的资源用于在政治边界上相互争斗。我们推导出分离的概率和资源转移到分离主义冲突的数量，并显示这些变量如何取决于异质性成本，规模经济，相对大小和外部威胁等因素。我们还模拟了政府类型的国内冲突，边界已确定后，并研究这种政治冲突如何影响的激励分离。
This paper studies secessions as the outcome of conflict between regions. We study under what conditions regions will divert costly resources to fight each other over political borders. We derive the probability of secession and the amount of resources diverted to separatist conflict, and show how those variables depend on factors such as heterogeneity costs, economies of scale, relative size, and external threats. We also model civil conflict over types of government, after borders have been determined, and study how this political conflict affects the incentives to secede.