Multidivisional Firms, Internal Competition, and the Merger Paradox
Multidivisional Firms, Internal Competition, and the Merger Paradox
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DOI：
10.1111/j.0008-4085.2004.00255.x
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发表时间：
2004-10
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
C. Davidson;Anthony Creane
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. Davidson;Anthony Creane
传统的合并模式要求被合并的公司（内部人）进行合作，使共同利润最大化。这种方法在数量设定博弈中有几个不吸引人的结果，例如，合并通常对内部人来说是不有利可图的，但对非合并公司（外部人）来说是有利可图的。我们采取了不同的方法，允许母公司可以发挥每个内部人对彼此。在数量设定博弈中，采用我们的方法，兼并对内部人有利，对外部人无利可图，对社会有益，并且（在非垄断兼并中）只涉及少数公司。最后，我们发现，最优策略取决于企业是否在数量或价格上竞争。
Traditional modelling of mergers has the merged firms (insiders) cooperate and maximize joint profits. This approach has several unappealing results in quantity-setting games, for example, mergers typically are not profitable for insiders, but are profitable for non-merging firms (outsiders). We take a different approach and allow for a parent company that can play each insider off one another. In quantity-setting games, with our approach mergers are profitable for insiders, unprofitable for outsiders, socially beneficial, and involve (in a non-monopolizing merger) a small number of firms. Finally, we find that the optimal strategy depends on whether firms compete in quantity or prices.