The Challenge of Abstract Concepts
The Challenge of Abstract Concepts
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DOI：
10.1037/bul0000089
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发表时间：
2017-03-01
影响因子：
22.4
通讯作者：
Tummolini, Luca
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Borghi, Anna M.;Binkofski, Ferdinand;Tummolini, Luca
概念（“自由”）不同于具体的概念（“猫”），因为它们没有一个有界限的、可识别的、清晰可感知的参照物。抽象概念的表现方式最近成为了一个激烈争论的话题，特别是因为认知的具身方法的传播。在这个框架中，概念的意义来源于与世界在线互动的感知、运动和情感系统。然而，支持这一观点的大多数证据都是关于具体概念的。鉴于抽象概念与高阶认知的相关性，我们认为能够解释它们如何被表示是任何认知理论都需要解决的关键挑战。本文的目的是对抽象概念的最新理论进行批判性的回顾，重点是具体化的理论。从质疑抽象概念和具体概念之间区别的理论开始，我们回顾了声称抽象概念基于隐喻、情境和内省以及情感的理论。然后，我们介绍了多重表征理论，根据该理论，抽象概念可以唤起感觉运动和语言信息。我们认为，最有希望的方法是由多重表征观点给出的，这种观点结合了体现的观点和对语言和社会经验重要性的认识。最后，我们将讨论一个单一的理论框架是否能够解释所有不同种类的抽象概念。
concepts ("freedom") differ from concrete ones ("cat"), as they do not have a bounded, identifiable, and clearly perceivable referent. The way in which abstract concepts are represented has recently become a topic of intense debate, especially because of the spread of the embodied approach to cognition. Within this framework concepts derive their meaning from the same perception, motor, and emotional systems that are involved in online interaction with the world. Most of the evidence in favor of this view, however, has been gathered with regard to concrete concepts. Given the relevance of abstract concepts for higher-order cognition, we argue that being able to explain how they are represented is a crucial challenge that any theory of cognition needs to address. The aim of this article is to offer a critical review of the latest theories on abstract concepts, focusing on embodied ones. Starting with theories that question the distinction between abstract and concrete concepts, we review theories claiming that abstract concepts are grounded in metaphors, in situations and introspection, and in emotion. We then introduce multiple representation theories, according to which abstract concepts evoke both sensorimotor and linguistic information. We argue that the most promising approach is given by multiple representation views that combine an embodied perspective with the recognition of the importance of linguistic and social experience. We conclude by discussing whether or not a single theoretical framework might be able to explain all different varieties of abstract concepts.