Life of the Party: The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Persistence under Single-Party Rule
Life of the Party: The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Persistence under Single-Party Rule
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党的生活：一党统治下政权崩溃和持续的根源
DOI：
10.1353/wp.2006.0004
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Benjamin Smith
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Benjamin Smith
本文发展了一种一党政权巩固的理论来解释这些政权在寿命上的巨大差异。它认为，反对党的力量和政党整合期间的租金稀缺，构成了精英们在决定如何建立支持基础时的选择。弱小的反对派和现成的租金使低成本的整合成为可能，但这些条件几乎没有动力建立一个强大的联盟或强大的政党组织；这种轨迹产生了脆弱的一党统治，在危机中很可能崩溃。相反，面对强大的反对派和稀缺的租金，精英们别无选择，只能向潜在的盟友提供参与决策的机会，并有强大的动力来建立一个强大而广泛的政党组织。从这样的初始条件中崛起的执政党在后来的危机中表现得更有弹性。作者针对几内亚比绍和坦桑尼亚以及印度尼西亚和菲律宾的成对比较，对这一论点进行了初步检验。
This article develops a theory of single-party regime consolidation to explain the dramatic variation in longevity among these regimes. The strength of the opposition and rent scarcity during party consolidation, it argues, structure the choices available to elites as they decide how to build a support base. A weak opposition and ready access to rents makes a low-cost consolidation possible, but these conditions provide little incentive to build a robust coalition or strong party organization; this trajectory generates weak single-party rule that is likely to collapse in a crisis. Conversely, elites who face a powerful opposition and scarce rents have no choice but to offer potential allies access to policy-making and have powerful incentives to build a strong and broad-based party organization. Ruling parties that emerge from initial conditions like these prove more resilient during later crises. The author conducts an initial test of the argument against paired comparisons of Guinea-Bissau and Tanzania and of Indonesia and the Philippines.