Supply chain finance with partial credit guarantee provided by a third-party or a supplier
Supply chain finance with partial credit guarantee provided by a third-party or a supplier
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由第三方或供应商提供部分信用担保的供应链金融
DOI：
10.1016/j.cie.2019.06.026
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发表时间：
2019-09-01
影响因子：
7.9
通讯作者：
Huang, Jiazhou
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Lu, Qihui;Gu, Jian;Huang, Jiazhou
本研究研究了零售商向银行借款时由第三方或供应商提供部分信用担保（PCG）的两种供应链金融模型。该研究评估了两种担保模型中零售商的最优订单数量和银行的公平定价利率。研究结果证实，第三方担保的财务模型可能并不总是适用，因为当担保率较低或市场风险较高时，第三方担保公司的利润可能为负。对于第三方的有效担保，零售商的最优决策可能会受到第三方担保人利润非负条件的限制。对两种PCG模型的比较分析结果表明，零售商总是更喜欢供应商保证模型。如果第三方担保模式中的担保率较低，那么供应商总是可以从供应商担保模式中受益，否则，供应商将为相对贫穷或富裕的零售商提供担保。令人惊讶的是，即使零售商很穷、市场风险很高，供应商也有动力提供担保。数值分析发现，零售商或供应商对担保模型的偏好与市场风险和担保率有很大关系。
This study investigates two supply chain finance models with partial credit guarantee (PCG) provided by a third-party or a supplier when a retailer borrows from a bank. The study evaluates the optimal order quantities of retailers and the fairly priced interest rates of banks in the two guarantee models. Findings corroborate that the financial model with third-party guarantee may not always be applicable because the profit of the third-party guarantor company may be negative when the guarantee rate is low or the market risk is relatively high. For an effective guarantee from the third-party, the retailer's optimal decision may be limited by the nonnegative condition on the profit of the third-party guarantor. Results of a comparative analysis on the two PCG models affirm that the retailer always prefers the supplier guarantee model. If the guarantee rate in the third-party guarantee model is low, then the supplier can always benefit from the supplier guarantee model, otherwise, the supplier will provide the guarantee for relatively poor or rich retailers. Surprisingly, even if the retailer is poor and the market risk is high, the supplier has an incentive to provide a guarantee. Numerical analysis finds that the preference on the guarantee model of the retailer or the supplier is quite dependent with the market risk and guarantee rate.