A Reputation-Based Contract for Repeated Crowdsensing With Costly Verification
A Reputation-Based Contract for Repeated Crowdsensing With Costly Verification
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DOI：
10.1109/tsp.2019.2952050
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发表时间：
2019-11
影响因子：
5.4
通讯作者：
D. G. Dobakhshari;Parinaz Naghizadeh;M. Liu;V. Gupta
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. G. Dobakhshari;Parinaz Naghizadeh;M. Liu;V. Gupta
系统操作员要求一组传感器付出高昂的努力，以便随着时间的推移收集感兴趣值的准确测量数据。在每个时刻，每个传感器都被要求向操作员报告其观测结果，并因其所付出的高昂努力而得到适当补偿。由于努力程度和观测结果对于传感器来说都是私有信息，一种仅基于传感器自行报告的努力程度和测量值进行补偿的简单支付方案将导致传感器偷懒以及伪造结果。在本文中，我们设计了一种合适的补偿方案，以激励传感器既付出高昂努力，又如实报告所得观测结果。为此，我们将该问题表述为一个重复博弈，并提出一种补偿方案，该方案采用操作员的随机验证以及一种为每个传感器分配信誉的算法。通过在确定当前支付时纳入传感器的行为历史，我们表明操作员可以激励传感器付出更多努力以及更频繁地如实报告。
A system operator asks a group of sensors toexert costly effort to collect accurate measurements of a value of interest over time. At each time, each sensor is asked to report its observation to the operator, and is suitably compensated for the costly effort it exerts. Since both the effort and the observation are private information for the sensor, a naive payment scheme which compensates the sensor based only on its self-reported values of the effort and the measurements will lead to both shirking and falsification of outcomes by the sensor. In this paper, we design an appropriate compensation scheme to incentivize the sensors to both exert costly effort and then reveal the resulting observation truthfully. To this end, we formulate the problem as a repeated game and propose a compensation scheme that employs stochastic verification by the operator coupled with an algorithm to assign a reputation to each sensor. By including the history of the behavior exerted by the sensor in determining present payments, we show that the operator can incentivize higher effort as well as more frequent truthtelling by the sensors.