Horizontal Mergers in Optimal Auctions
Horizontal Mergers in Optimal Auctions
复制标题
最佳拍卖中的横向合并
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2742187
复制
发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
S. Tschantz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Luke M. Froeb;Vlad Mares;S. Tschantz
在本文中，我们研究了当拍卖师能够对市场集中度的变化做出最佳反应时，投标人之间合并的影响。我们发现，拍卖师行使这种“买方权力”的能力限制了合并后的投标人行使“市场权力”的能力。特别是，虽然合并总是损害拍卖师的利益，但其损害程度比公开拍卖基准要小得多。投标人的集中度很重要，但不如拍卖师的预订效用重要。我们还发现，合并对非合并投标人有利，但当潜在盈余足够小时，合并将变得无利可图。福利效应很复杂，因为它们既取决于合并方的概况，也取决于拍卖师的保留效用。
In this paper we study the impact of mergers among bidders when the auctioneer can respond optimally to changes in the market concentration. We find that the auctioneer's ability to exercise such "buyer power" limits the ability of the merged bidders to exercise "market power." In particular, while mergers always harm the auctioneer, the magnitude of the harm is much smaller than in an open auction benchmark. Bidder concentration matters but is less important than the auctioneer's reservation utility. We also find that mergers benefit non-merging bidders, and will become unprofitable when the potential surplus is small enough. Welfare effects are complex as they depend both on the profile of the merging parties as well as on the auctioneer's reservation utility.