Private and public supply of liquidity
Private and public supply of liquidity
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DOI：
10.1086/250001
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发表时间：
1998-02-01
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
Tirole, J
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Holmstrom, B;Tirole, J
本文解决了一个基本但尚未解决的问题：对私人资产的索求权是否为生产部门的有效运作提供了足够的流动性？或者，国家是否可以通过调整政府证券的存量或其他方式，在创造流动性和监管流动性方面发挥作用？在我们的模型中，公司可以通过三种方式满足未来的流动性需求：发行新的债权，从金融中介机构获得信贷额度，以及持有其他公司的债权。当不存在总不确定性时，我们证明这些工具足以实现投资者和企业之间的社会最优（次优）契约。然而，实施可能需要中介机构协调稀缺流动性的使用，在这种情况下，与中介机构签订的合同对公司施加了最大杠杆率和流动性约束。当只有总体不确定性时，私人部门无法满足自身的流动性需求。政府可以通过发行承诺未来消费者收入的债券来改善福利。政府债券的流动性溢价高于私人债权。政府应该对债务进行管理，使流动性在总流动性冲击大的时候放松（债券价值高），在流动性冲击小的时候收紧。因此，本文提出了政府提供流动性和积极管理流动性的基本原理。
This paper addresses a basic, yet unresolved, question: Do claims on private assets provide sufficient liquidity for an efficient functioning of the productive sector? Or does the state have a role in creating liquidity and regulating it either through adjustments in the stock of government securities or by other means? In our model, firms can meet future liquidity needs in three ways: by issuing new claims, by obtaining a credit line from a financial intermediary, and by holding claims on other firms. When there is no aggregate uncertainty, we show that these instruments are sufficient for implementing the socially optimal (second-best) contract between investors and firms. However, the implementation may require an intermediary to coordinate the use of scarce liquidity, in which case contracts with the intermediary impose both a maximum leverage ratio and a liquidity constraint on firms. When there is only aggregate uncertainty, the private sector cannot satisfy its own liquidity needs. The government can improve welfare by issuing bonds that commit future consumer income. Government bonds command a liquidity premium over private claims. The government should manage debt so that liquidity is loosened (the value of bonds is high) when the aggregate liquidity shock is high and is tightened when the liquidity shock is low. The paper thus suggests a rationale both for government-supplied liquidity and for its active management.